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Abstract
Antitrust scholars have argued that exclusive contracts have anticompetitive, or
at best neutral effects, if no efficiencies are generated. In contrast, this paper
shows that exclusive contracts can have procompetitive effects, provided buyers
are imperfect downstream competitors and contract breach is feasible. In that
case an efficient entrant is not necessarily foreclosed through exclusive contracting
but induces buyers to breach. Because breaching buyers have to pay expectation
damages to the incumbent, the downstream profits they obtain when breaching
must be large enough. Therefore, the entrant needs to set a lower wholesale
price than absent exclusive contracting, leading to lower final consumer prices
and higher welfare.
Keywords: Exclusive Contracting; Naked Exclusion; Contract Breach; An-
titrust Policy
JEL classification: D43, K21, L12, L42
1 Introduction
In many recent antitrust cases incumbent upstream firms were alleged of having used
exclusive contracts to deter potentially more efficient entrants, thereby harming con-
sumers.1 In these cases courts need to balance anticompetitive effects caused by en-
try deterrence or increased wholesale prices against potential efficiency gains created
through exclusive contracting within the vertical production chain.
FWe would like to thank Bernhard Ganglmair, Fabian Herweg, Klaus Schmidt, seminar participants
at the Universities of Du¨sseldorf and Munich and participants at the IMPRS-CI Workshop 2011 for
very helpful comments and suggestions.
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1Recent examples are United States v. Transitions Optical, United States v. Dentsply, Pernod
Ricard and Campbell Distillers v. Bacardi-Martini, Langnese-Iglo v. European Commission, and
United States v. Microsoft.
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In this paper we point out that exclusive contracting can have procompetitive effects
even if no efficiency gains are generated, provided downstream competition is moderate
and downstream firms can breach exclusive contracts. The intuition is the following.
Suppose the downstream firms signed the exclusive contract with the incumbent. In
that case, the entrant may nevertheless find it profitable to enter since it can induce
the downstream firm to breach the contract. Because breaching downstream firms
have to pay expectation damages to the incumbent, they only breach when they can
obtain sufficiently large downstream profits. Therefore, the entrant needs to sell its
input at a relatively low wholesale price. Using a framework developed by Simpson
and Wickelgren (2007), we show that for moderate degrees of downstream competition
this mechanism leads to lower final consumer prices than without exclusive contracting
and therefore to a rise in welfare.
Our result stands in stark contrast to the previous literature, which asserts that
exclusive contracting has anticompetitive, or at best neutral effects, if no efficiencies are
generated. As is well known, “Chicago School” scholars (e.g., Posner, 1976, and Bork,
1978) argue for a neutral effect. They assume that downstream buyers are independent
monopolists (or final consumers). In this situation, where downstream firms do not
compete, the incumbent’s gain in profit through entry deterrence is lower than the
downstream firms’ loss in profit. Therefore, the incumbent is unable to compensate
the downstream firms for signing exclusive contracts, given no efficiencies are generated.
Rasmusen, Ramseyer and Wiley (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000) challenge this
argument, pointing out that the entrant may not be able to reach the minimum efficient
scale when selling only to a fraction of buyers, implying that downstream firms exert
a negative externality on each other when signing. The incumbent can induce the
downstream firms to sign by exploiting this externality.
Fumagalli and Motta (2006) analyze the case in which downstream buyers are not
independent monopolists but perfect Bertrand competitors and argue for a neutral
effect. With perfect downstream competition the entrant needs to sell only to a single
downstream firm to reach the minimum efficient scale, which removes the negative
externality that signing downstream firms exert. To bring out this effect Fumagalli
and Motta (2006) assume that downstream firms face a fixed fee of being active in the
downstream market. When all but one firm signed the contract, the firms that signed
face a higher wholesale price and therefore stay inactive, which enables the single firm
that did not sign to earn monopoly profits. As a consequence, each downstream firm
demands the monopoly profit as compensation for signing, so that exclusive contracting
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becomes too costly for the incumbent. Several follow-up papers show that a different
picture emerges once the assumption on the fixed fee of being active is dropped.2 These
papers show that it becomes easier for the incumbent to induce downstream firms to
sign if downstream competition increases.3 The reason is that signing downstream
firms stay active, thereby exerting competitive pressure on downstream firms that do
not sign. This limits the profits that downstream firms can obtain by not signing
the exclusive contract. Thus, the compensation that the incumbent needs to offer for
signing decreases.
An important limitation of these papers is the assumption that once downstream
firms have signed exclusive contracts, they cannot breach them later. Therefore, if all
firms have signed, this inevitably leads to entry deterrence. Common law, however,
provides each party to a contract the opportunity to breach by paying expectation
damages to the injured party. While in some situations breach of contract may indeed
be prohibitively costly due to reputational reasons or high litigation costs, it seems
unreasonable to assume generally that contract breach is not feasible. Simpson and
Wickelgren (2007) provide an insightful model in which they incorporate the possi-
bility of contract breach. They analyze the cases in which downstream firms are (i)
independent monopolists and (ii) (almost) perfect Bertrand competitors. The incum-
bent is able to induce downstream firms to sign exclusive contracts only in case (ii).
Simpson and Wickelgren (2007) find, however, that due to the possibility of contract
breach signing does not lead to entry deterrence. Nevertheless, exclusive contracting
is anticompetitive in that case because the entrant induces just a single downstream
firm to breach, and this firm monopolizes the market, leading to higher final consumer
prices.
We extend the analysis of Simpson and Wickelgren (2007) to account for general
degrees of product differentiation between downstream firms. Particularly moderate
degrees of product differentiation are relevant and therefore important to consider as
products are often physically differentiated and consumers have different preferences
for one or the other good. As a central result we find that for such moderate degrees of
product differentiation exclusive contracting can have procompetitive effects, even if no
efficiencies are generated. To gain insight, when the degree of product differentiation is
moderate, the entrant induces not just a single downstream firm but both downstream
2See, for example, Abito and Wright (2008), Wright (2008, 2009) and Kitamura (2010).
3A similar argument is put forward in earlier works by Stefanidis (1998), Yong (1999) and Simpson
and Wickelgren (2001). In these papers, though, the authors assume that the incumbent can commit
to a certain wholesale price when offering the exclusive contract.
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firms to breach because it receives sizable profits from both these firms. When breach-
ing, the firms have to pay expectation damages to the incumbent. Thus, in order to
render breaching profitable the entrant must set its wholesale price sufficiently low.
In particular, the wholesale price it needs to set lies below the one that the upstream
firms would set absent exclusive contracting. As a consequence, final consumer prices
fall and total welfare rises.4
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets out the model. In Section 3 we
present our result with a general demand function. Section 4 provides an example with
a linear demand function and Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
In this section we outline the model, which follows Simpson and Wickelgren (2007).
Everything described below is common knowledge to all agents. We analyze an indus-
try with an upstream and a downstream market. In the upstream market an incumbent
firm I and a potential entrant E produce a homogeneous input good. In the down-
stream market two differentiated firms i and j process the input good at a one-to-one
technology and compete in prices for final consumers.
For tractability reasons we assume that downstream firms i and j are symmetric.
Downstream firm i’s demand function when setting a price pi and when the rival sets
a price pj is given by D(pi, pj;γ), with ∂D(pi, pj;γ)/∂pi < 0, ∂D(pi, pj;γ)/∂pj ≥ 0 and
|∂D(pi, pj;γ)/∂pi| ≥ |∂D(pi, pj;γ)/∂pj|. A downstream firm’s demand is falling in its
own price, it is rising in its rival’s price, and the absolute effect of its own price is larger
than the effect of its rival’s price. In this demand function, γ ∈ [0, 1) is a parameter
representing the degree of downstream competition or product differentiation, that is,
∂D(pi, pj;γ)/∂pi < 0 is weakly decreasing and ∂D(pi, pj;γ)/∂pj ≥ 0 is strictly increas-
ing in γ. For γ = 0, the two products are independent, implying that each downstream
firm is a monopolist, that is ∂D(pi, pj;0)/∂pj = 0 and |∂D(pi, pj;γ)/∂pi| is minimal.
As γ → 1, the two products become perfect substitutes, implying perfect Bertrand
competition, that is lim
γ→1
∂D(pi, pj;γ)/∂pj = ∞ and lim
γ→1
∂D(pi, pj;γ)/∂pi = −∞ as
long as both demands are strictly positive. We impose two technical assumptions,
4As shown by Mathewson and Winter (1987) and Bernheim and Whinston (1998) if two incumbent
manufacturers compete for exclusive dealing contracts, the effects of exclusive contracting can also be
procompetitive. However, the mechanisms leading to these effects—that manufacturer competition
for exclusive representation is tougher than standard competition, or that exclusive dealing reduces
the incentive conflict of a risk-averse retailer—are very different from the one identified in this paper,
in which exclusive dealing is used for entry deterrence reasons.
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∂2D(pi, pj;γ)/∂p
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i ≤ 0 (or not too positive) and ∂2D(pi, pj;γ)/(∂pi∂pj) ≥ 0, which
guarantee that each downstream firm’s demand function is concave and that equilib-
rium prices are strategic complements, i.e., ∂pi/∂pj > 0. They also ensure that firm
i’s profit is increasing in the cost of firm j.
The timing of the game is as follows (see also Table 1). In the first stage, I makes
simultaneous nondiscriminatory exclusive contract offers to the downstream firms.5 An
exclusive contract is a compensation x from I to the downstream firms in exchange for
the downstream firms’ commitment to purchase exclusively from I. After observing
these offers, the downstream firms simultaneously decide whether to accept or reject
them. In the second stage, E decides on entry. In stage 3.1, active upstream firms set
wholesale prices to each available downstream firm. I is able to discriminate between
those downstream firms that have signed the exclusive contract (captive downstream
firms) and those who have not (free downstream firms). It offers a wholesale price
wc to captive downstream firms and a wholesale price wf to free downstream firms.
E offers a wholesale price we to free downstream firms.
6 Captive downstream firms
can become free by breaching and paying expectation damages to I in stage 3.2. In
accordance with common law I’s expectation damages are based on its lost profits.
It needs to be restored to the position it would have been in had the contract been
performed.7 We assume, if both downstream firms breach, each one pays half of the
expectation damages. In stage 3.3, I and E produce the input good. Free downstream
firms purchase the input good from E if we ≤ wf and from I if we > wf . Captive
downstream firms purchase from I at wc. Downstream firms compete for consumers
by setting prices pi and pj.
Table 1: Time Line
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3.1 Stage 3.2 Stage 3.3
I offers excl. contract E enters or not I sets prices wf , wc i,j can breach i,j buy input
i,j accept or reject E sets price we i,j compete
To simplify the notation, we denote the equilibrium downstream price vector p(wi, wj) =
[pi(wi, wj), pj(wj, wi)]
T when needed as an argument in firm i’s demand and p(wj, wi) =
5Our results would not change if we assumed that I makes sequential or discriminatory offers.
6As Simpson and Wickelgren (2007) we restrict our attention to the case of linear wholesale prices.
For a brief discussion on two-part tariffs see the Conclusion.
7In accordance with Simpson and Wickelgren (2007) we consider the situation in which breaching
downstream firms are subject to expectation damages. In contrast, Aghion and Bolton (1987), Innes
and Sexton (1994) and Spier and Whinston (1995) assume that incumbent and downstream firms can
sign contracts with liquidated damages. As will become evident later, the main mechanism driving
our result would also be at work in case of liquidated damages. For a discussion on the difference
between expectation and liquidated damages see Brodley and Ma (1993).
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[pj(wj, wi), pi(wi, wj)]
T when needed as an argument in firm j’s demand.
Upstream firms I and E incur a constant marginal cost of cI and cE. We assume
that E is more efficient than I, i.e., cE < cI , but that it incurs a sunk cost f when
entering. We further assume that E is sufficiently efficient that it can cover this fixed
costs when selling to both downstream firms at a wholesale price of w′E, where w
′
E
is the wholesale price that E must charge to induce a downstream firm to breach
provided the rival downstream firm does not breach.8 Therefore, we impose that 2(w′E−
cE)D(p(w
′
E, w
′
E);γ) > f , where D(p(w
′
E, w
′
E);γ) is a downstream firm’s demand given
that both downstream firms face an input price of w′E and set their downstream prices
accordingly.9 As will become evident later, the underlying economics driving the main
effect are not affected by this assumption.10
To avoid the epsilon notation on prices and compensations, we assume that the
downstream firms sign the exclusive contract when they are indifferent between signing
or not, they breach the exclusive contract when they are indifferent between breaching
or not, and they buy from E when they are indifferent between buying from E or I.
Our equilibrium concept is subgame perfection with the additional refinement that
if multiple equilibria arise, the downstream firms play the equilibrium that is Pareto
dominant from their perspective. This assumption is necessary because in stage 3.2 of
the game multiple equilibria can arise in which either both downstream firms or none
of them breaches the exclusive contract.
Finally, we assume thatD(p(cI , cI);γ)(p(cI , cI)−cI) ≥ D(p(wc, cI);γ)(p(wc, cI)−cI),
where wc solves the maximization problem maxw D(p(w, cI);γ)(w− cI). This assump-
tion implies that a downstream firm is better off when it competes in the downstream
market on the basis of its true costs cI than on costs wc > cI , where wc is set to
maximize a profit function with a different mark-up. This assumption simplifies the
proofs of the arguments but is not crucial for our general effect to hold. It is easy to
verify that the assumption is satisfied for many commonly used demand functions such
as the linear one considered in Section 4, CES, logit or Hotelling.11
8The explicit definition of w′E is given in (4) in the Appendix.
9A similar assumption is imposed by Simpson and Wickelgren (2007) who assume 2(cI −
cE)D(p(cI , cI);γ) > f . It is easy to show that w′E → cI if downstream firms are in perfect Bertrand
competition. Therefore, our assumption adjusts the one by Simpson and Wickelgren (2007) to the
case of differentiated products.
10See also the comments in the Conclusion.
11In general, it is well-known from the literature on strategic delegation or vertical restraints (e.g.,
Fershtman and Judd, 1987, or Bonanno and Vickers, 1985) that competing on the basis of higher costs
than the true costs can be beneficial for a firm as it induces the rival firm to react less aggressively.
However, this argument relies on the fact that, at the true input costs of firm Di, a change in these
costs has only a second-order effect on the optimal choice of firm Di but a first-order effect on the
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3 The Effect in General Form
We first look at the equilibrium in the downstream market when downstream firm i
faces a wholesale price wi while the downstream firm j faces a wholesale price wj. Firm
i’s profit function is
pii = D(pi, pj;γ)(pi − wi).
The first-order conditions are given by
∂D(pi, pj;γ)
∂pi
(pi − wi) +D(pi, pj;γ) = 0, i 6= j, i, j = 1, 2. (1)
These first-order conditions characterize the equilibrium of the downstream game.
Since we assume that |∂D(pi, pj;γ)/∂pi| > |∂D(pi, pj;γ)/∂pj|, the equilibrium is unique.
Due to the other assumptions we have the natural properties that in equilibrium
dpi/dwi > 0 and dpi/dwj > 0.
Since γ → 1 implies ∂D(pi, pj)/∂pi → −∞, we obtain that profits become zero
when products are undifferentiated. By contrast, when γ = 0, implying that the
downstream firms are independent monopolists, profits are largest.
In the following we assess for which levels of downstream competition the incumbent
can profitably make use of exclusive contracting.
Lemma 1 If downstream competition is sufficiently strong, i.e., γ ≥ γ̂, in any equi-
librium both downstream firms sign the exclusive contract with the incumbent.
The lemma shows that the incumbent can profitably offer positive payments to the
downstream firms for signing an exclusive contract if downstream competition is suf-
ficiently intense. The intuition for this result is the following. Exclusive contracting
enables the incumbent to earn monopoly profits. In addition, when downstream com-
petition is intense, double marginalization is only a minor problem, implying that the
incumbent’s monopoly profits when inducing both firms to sign are relatively high. By
contrast, the profits that the downstream firms can obtain when rejecting the contract
decrease with the degree of downstream competition. Thus, the incumbent is able to
profitably compensate the downstream firms for signing an exclusive contract when
downstream competition is sufficiently intense.
The result of Lemma 1 is close to that by Simpson and Wickelgren (2007) who
show that the incumbent can induce both downstream firms to sign exclusive contracts
choice of the rival firm. By contrast, in our case wc is set according to a different maximization
problem implying that it is biased upwards to a large extent.
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if downstream competition is almost perfect. We now move one step further and
determine the optimal pricing decision of the entrant given both downstream firms
have signed the contract.
Lemma 2 If γ ≤ γ ≤ γ, with γ ≥ γ̂, both signed downstream firms breach the exclusive
contract and buy from the entrant at a wholesale price we < cI .
Lemma 2 shows that both signed downstream firms are induced to breach at a
wholesale price below cI if the degree of downstream competition is in an intermediate
range. The intuition for this result is the following. Because breaching downstream
firms have to pay expectation damages to the incumbent, they only breach when they
can obtain sufficiently high profits in the downstream market. If the degree of down-
stream competition is in an intermediate range, each firm obtains sizable profits when
breaching even if the rival firm also breaches. Therefore, the entrant needs to lower
its wholesale price only to relatively small extent to bring about breach of both down-
stream firms instead of only one. Thus, in this intermediate range the entrant induces
both firms to breach in equilibrium. Because downstream firms exert a negative ex-
ternality on each other when breaching, which gets stronger with the degree of down-
stream competition, the entrant needs to price below the Bertrand duopoly price cI
when γ ≥ γ. By contrast, when downstream competition is intense, the negative ex-
ternality that breaching downstream firms exert on each other is so strong that each
downstream firm can only obtain very small profits when breaching if the rival firm
also breaches. In that case, as shown by Simpson and Wickelgren (2007), the entrant
prefers to induce only one firm to breach.
From Lemma 2 we know, if γ ≤ γ ≤ γ both signed downstream firms breach the
exclusive contract and face a wholesale price we < cI . If exclusive contracting was not
allowed for, they would face a wholesale price equal to cI . This gives us the following
result.
Proposition 1 If γ ≤ γ ≤ γ, exclusive dealing has procompetitive effects.
The proposition shows that naked exclusion can indeed be welfare enhancing. For
γ ≤ γ ≤ γ the entrant induces both signed downstream firms to breach the contract by
setting its wholesale price below cI . Because downstream firms obtain the input good
at a lower cost, they set lower prices to final consumers, which leads to an increase in
consumer surplus and welfare.
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If products are sufficiently differentiated, i.e., γ < γ, the possibility of exclusive
contracting is competitively innocuous because either the incumbent cannot pay the
downstream firms to accept exclusive contracts or the entrant can induce both down-
stream firms to breach at a price equal to cI . In both cases welfare is unaffected by
the possibility of exclusive contracting.
The effect of exclusive contracting on welfare is not clear for γ > γ. The entrant
sets a lower wholesale price to the single free downstream firm than it would set ab-
sent exclusive contracting. However, the captive downstream firm now faces a higher
wholesale price. Thus, the downstream firms may set higher prices to final consumers
than they would set absent exclusive contracting, in which case exclusive contracting
would have anticompetitive effects. As shown by Simpson and Wickelgren (2007), the
latter effect dominates if γ → 1.
Our analysis shows that for a general class of demand functions naked exclusion
can have procompetitive effects. However, the analysis so far does not allow us to
draw conclusions on how large the specific regions for γ are. This depends on the exact
shape of the demand function. Therefore, we provide an example with a linear demand
function in the next section.
4 An Application with Linear Demand
In this section we show that with a commonly used linear demand function exclu-
sive contracting is procompetitive in a sizable range, in which the degree of product
differentiation between the downstream firms is moderate.
We assume that demand is defined by the standard representative consumer model
(see e.g., Vives, 1999), where a consumer’s utility is given by
U(qi, qj) = (qi + qj)−
(q2i + q
2
j ) + 2γqiqj
2
+ v.
Here, qi is the amount of consumption from downstream firm i and v is the consumption
of an outside good whose marginal utility is normalized to one. The parameter γ ∈ [0, 1)
again reflects the degree of product differentiation between the downstream firms. For
γ = 0 the two goods are independent, while for γ → 1 they become perfect substitutes.
If consumers maximize this utility subject to an income constraint, the inverse demand
of downstream firm i becomes pi = 1−qi−γqj. It is straightforward to derive the Nash
equilibrium in the downstream market by maximizing the downstream firms’ profit for
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given wholesale prices wi and wj. Downstream firm i’s price in this equilibrium is given
by
pi =
(1− γ)(2 + γ) + 2wi + γwj
(2− γ)(2 + γ) .
Both downstream firms receive positive demand only if their prices are sufficiently
close to each other. If their prices strongly diverge, the higher priced downstream
firm receives no demand, while the lower priced downstream firm captures the entire
market. Specifically, downstream firm i’s demand function is given by
qi =

1− pi if 0 < pi ≤ −1+γ+pjγ ,
1−γ−pi+γpj
(1−γ2) if
−1+γ+pj
γ
< pi < 1− γ + γpj,
0 if 1− γ + γpj ≤ pi.
We measure the entrant’s efficiency advantage by θ, where cI = θw
m(cE)+ (1− θ)cE.12
Here, wm(cE) denotes the monopoly wholesale price when a firm’s marginal cost is cE,
i.e., wm(cE) = (1 + cE)/2. Hence, θ = 0 implies that the entrant has no efficiency
advantage, while θ = 1 implies that the entrant’s efficiency advantage is just drastic.
To simplify the exposition we assume that θ ≥ 0.121 and f = 0.13 The first assumption
is the equivalent to cE < w
′
E in the general demand case. Together with the second
assumption it rules out the case in which entry is not profitable for E.
We first assess for which degrees of downstream competition the incumbent can
profitably make use of exclusive contracting.
Lemma 1′ If downstream competition is sufficiently strong, i.e., γ ∈ [0.5, 1), both
downstream firms sign the exclusive contract with the incumbent.
Next, we determine the wholesale prices that the upstream firms set in equilibrium.
Lemma 2′
• The entrant sells to both downstream firms if (i) γ ∈ [0, 0.714) or (ii) γ ∈
[0.714, 0.899) ∧ θ ≥ θˆ(γ).
• The entrant sells to one downstream firm if (i) γ ∈ [0.714, 0.899) ∧ θ < θˆ(γ) or
(ii) γ ∈ [0.899, 1).
• The entrant sets we = cI if γ ∈ [0, 0.618) and we < cI if γ ∈ [0.618, 1).
12This notation of the efficiency advantage follows Abito and Wright (2008).
13Here and in the following numbers are rounded up to three decimals.
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Here, θˆ(γ) : [0.714, 0.899]→ [0.114, 1] is a strictly increasing function, which is defined
in equation (13) in the Appendix.
Congruent with Lemma 2, this lemma shows that dependent on the degree of prod-
uct differentiation the entrant sells either to both or to one downstream firm. Addi-
tionally, the entrant’s efficiency advantage plays a role when γ ∈ [0.710, 0.899). The
entrant sells to both firms only if its efficiency advantage is sufficiently high. The in-
tuition for this result is that the entrant’s profit gain through the increase in demand
when both firms breach is higher, the higher its efficiency advantage is, i.e., the lower
its marginal costs are. Lemma 2′ further shows that increased downstream competi-
tion makes it more difficult for breaching firms to raise the damage payment so that it
becomes necessary for the entrant to set its wholesale price below cI when γ ≥ 0.618.
In the following, we assess the effect of exclusive contracting on welfare and con-
sumer surplus. We compare the situation in which exclusive contracting is not possible
with the equilibrium of our game. Here, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 1′ The effect of exclusive contracting on welfare and consumer surplus is
neutral when γ ∈ [0, 0.618), positive when (i) γ ∈ [0.618, 0.714) or (ii) γ ∈ [0.714, 0.899)
∧ θ ≥ θˆ(γ), and negative when (i) γ ∈ [0.714, 0.899) ∧ θ < θˆ(γ) or (ii) γ ∈ [0.899, 1).
Proposition 1′ shows that with a commonly used demand function the effect of
exclusive contracting is procompetitive in a sizable range in which downstream compe-
tition is moderate. The range is the larger, the larger the entrant’s efficiency advantage
is.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have shown that naked exclusion has procompetitive effects if down-
stream firms can breach exclusive contracts and competition between them is moderate.
In this environment, both downstream firms sign the contract with the incumbent but
also both downstream firms breach it and buy from the entrant later on. Because down-
stream firms have to pay expectation damages to the incumbent when breaching, the
entrant must set its wholesale price sufficiently low. In particular, it must its wholesale
price lower than absent exclusive contracting. As a consequence, downstream firms set
lower prices to final consumers, which leads to a rise in consumer surplus and welfare.
Our analysis challenges the view that naked exclusion is anticompetitive or at best
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neutral—a conclusion emanating from the previous literature. We find that the ef-
fect of exclusive contracting absent efficiencies gains is only anticompetitive effects if
downstream competition is very intense, whereas it is procompetitive if downstream
competition is in an intermediate range. Hence, an important implication of our analy-
sis is that exclusive dealing, although being intended by an incumbent firm as an entry
deterring and therefore anticompetitive device, can have procompetitive effects. This
speaks against a per se approach toward exclusive dealing.
A limitation of our model is that we assumed that entry costs are sufficiently small.
We imposed this assumption to rule out the case in which the rival does not find it
profitable to enter. Dropping this assumption would affect our results in that exclu-
sive contracting would more readily lead to entry deterrence, and, therefore, render
exclusive dealing more likely to be anticompetitive.
Following Simpson and Wickelgren (2007) we confined our attention to linear up-
stream prices—the case of two-part tariffs is much more complicated and therefore
beyond the scope of this paper. If upstream firms could offer two-part tariffs the
analysis would change in two respects. On the one hand, the incumbent would be able
to avoid double marginalization implying that, when downstream firms sign exclusive
deals, the incumbent earns the monopoly profit of the industry regardless of the de-
gree of downstream competition. This makes exclusive dealing more profitable for the
incumbent and raises the damage payment that downstream firms have to pay in case
of contract breach. On the other hand, because the damage payment is higher in the
two-part tariff case, the entrant likely needs to offer a lower wholesale price with exclu-
sive dealing than without in order to render breaching profitable, given that negative
fixed fees are not possible, e.g., due to moral hazard issues. Thus, exclusive dealing
may again have procompetitive effects leading to even lower wholesale prices than in
case of linear upstream pricing. Therefore, it seems plausible that the effect identified
in this paper also carries over to the case of two-part tariffs.
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A Proof of Lemma 1
The proof proceeds in three steps. First, we calculate the compensation x2, which the
incumbent has to offer such that both downstream firms sign the exclusive contract.
Second, we calculate the compensation x1, which the incumbent has to offer such that
exactly one downstream firm signs the exclusive contract. Then, we compare the net
profits that the incumbent makes when it induces both, one or neither downstream
firm to sign.
In the following, we denote the number of signed downstream firms by S ∈ (0,1,2).
The compensation x2 must equal the additional profit that a downstream firm can make
when rejecting the contract given the other downstream firm accepts the contract:
x2 = pi
f
i|S=1 − pici|S=2.
Here, pifi|S=1 denotes a downstream firm’s profit when rejecting the contract while the
rival downstream firm accepts it. pici|S=2 denotes a downstream firm’s profit when
both accept it. For any compensation above x2 accepting is strictly preferred by the
downstream firms but I makes lower profits.
If both downstream firms accept the exclusive contract, I’s maximization problem
is14
max
wi,wj
D (p(wi, wj);γ) (wi − cI) +D(p(wj, wi);γ)(wj − cI).
Since both downstream firms are symmetric, the optimal input prices, wi and wj,
are identical. Let us denote the solution to this problem w∗i = w
∗
j = wI . When
both downstream firms are captive, I charges the monopoly wholesale price to them
as it receives the same profits from them whether they breach or not. I’s profit is
then ΠI|S=2 = 2D(p(wI , wI);γ)(wI − cI) and a downstream firm’s profit, excluding the
compensation payment, is pici|S=2 = D(p(wI , wI);γ)(p(wI , wI)− wI).
Now suppose that one downstream firm rejects the contract. In the subsequent price
game I and E compete for free downstream firms. Note that the captive downstream
firm can also become free by breaching the contract. The standard Bertrand argument
implies that I offers a wholesale price wf = cI and E offers a wholesale price we ≤ cI to
free downstream firms. It could be optimal for E to set we < cI to induce the captive
downstream firm to breach. In order to verify this, we determine whether the captive
14In the following we use D(pi, pj;γ) as a short-cut for max {0, D(pi, pj;γ)}, that is, we do not
explicitly write out if a demand function becomes zero. We do so to reduce the notational burden.
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downstream firm has an incentive to breach if E sets we = cI .
If the captive downstream firm does not breach the contract, its input price is wc.
Since I gets the same profit from the captive downstream firm whether it breaches
or not, wc is argmaxw D(p(w, cI);γ)(w − cI). This yields wc > cI . The captive
downstream firm’s profit when not breaching is D(p(wc, cI);γ)(p(wc, cI) − wc). If the
captive downstream firm instead breaches, its profit is D(p(cI , cI);γ)(p(cI , cI)− cI) net
the damage payment D(p(wc, cI); γ)(wc − cI) that it has to pay to I. Thus, breaching
is profitable for the captive downstream firm if
D(p(cI , cI);γ)(p(cI , cI)− cI)−D(p(wc, cI);γ)(wc− cI) ≥ D(p(wc, cI);γ)(p(wc, cI)−wc)
or
D(p(cI , cI);γ)(p(cI , cI)− cI) ≥ D(p(wc, cI);γ)(p(wc, cI)− cI),
which is satisfied by our assumption of Section 2. Hence, the captive downstream firm
breaches the contract when E sets we = cI , so that it is optimal for E to set we = cI
and no lower wholesale price. E finds it optimal to enter since by assumption 2(cI −
cE)D(p(cI , cI);γ) > f . As the captive downstream firm breaches, the downstream firm
that did not sign the contract makes profits equal to pifi|S=1 = D(p(cI , cI);γ)(p(cI , cI)−
cI). We can deduce that I has to offer
x2 = D(p(cI , cI);γ)(p(cI , cI)− cI)−D(p(wI , wI);γ)(p(wI , wI)− wI)
as compensation to each downstream firm for accepting the exclusive contract.
We now derive the compensation x1 that I has to offer to induce a single downstream
firm to sign the exclusive contract. This compensation must equal the additional profit
that a downstream firm can make when rejecting the exclusive contract provided the
other downstream firm rejects it, i.e.,
x1 = pi
f
i|S=0 − pici|S=1.
Here, pifi|S=0 denotes a downstream firm’s profit when both firms reject the contract,
while pici|S=1 denotes a downstream firm’s profit when it signs the contract while the
rival firm rejects it. If both downstream firms reject the contract, E enters and the
subsequent price game between the upstream firms results in the simple Bertrand
duopoly wholesale prices, i.e., both upstream firms set wholesale prices equal to cI .
Thus, when both downstream firms reject the contract, they make profits equal to
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pifi|S=0 = D(p(cI , cI);γ)(p(cI , cI)− cI).
From the analysis above we know that a downstream firm’s profit when it signs
the contract, while the rival firm rejects it, is pici|S=1 = D(p(cI , cI);γ)(p(cI , cI) − cI) −
D(p(wc, cI);γ)(wc − cI). We can deduce that I must offer
x1 = D(p(wc, cI);γ)(wc − cI)
as compensation in order to induce one downstream firm to sign the exclusive contract.
We now compare the net profits that I makes when inducing both downstream
firms, one or neither downstream firm to sign the exclusive contract. When it induces
both downstream firms to sign the exclusive contract, its net profit is
2
[
D(p(wI , wI);γ)(wI−cI)+D(p(wI , wI);γ)(p(wI , wI)−wI)−D(p(cI , cI);γ)(p(cI , cI)−cI)
]
.
It offers x2 to each downstream firm as compensation for signing and receives the
monopoly profit whether the downstream firms breach or not. When it induces one
downstream firm to sign its net profit is zero. It pays x1 as compensation for signing
to one downstream firm, makes zero profit and receives a damage payment equal to
x1 because the signed downstream firm breaches. Since I and E are perfect Bertrand
competitors but E is more efficient, I also makes zero net profit when inducing neither
downstream firm to sign. Hence, I makes use of exclusive contracting only if it is able
to profitably induce both downstream firms to accept the exclusive contract, i.e., if
D(p(cI , cI);γ)(p(cI , cI)− cI) ≤ D(p(wI , wI);γ)(p(wI , wI)− cI). (2)
If the products are independent of each other, i.e., if γ = 0, the left-hand side is larger
than the right-hand side since no double marginalization takes place. To the converse,
if the products are (almost) perfect substitutes, i.e., if γ → 1, the left-hand side is zero
since p(cI , cI)→ cI , while the right-hand side is still positive since p(wI , wI)→ wI > cI .
Therefore, there must exist an intermediate value of γ, denote it γ̂, such that both
downstream firms sign the exclusive contract if γ ≥ γ̂. 
B Proof of Lemma 2
If both downstream firms signed the exclusive contract, I charges the monopoly whole-
sale price wc = wI to captive downstream firms and the Bertrand duopoly price wf = cI
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to free downstream firms. Hence, E is constraint in its pricing decision to free down-
stream firms by we ≤ cI . It may choose to induce both downstream firms or one
downstream firm to breach. To induce both downstream firms to breach it needs to
set a wholesale price we = wE, where wE is defined by
D(p(wE, wE);γ)(p(wE, wE)− wE)−D(p(wI , wI);γ)(wI − cI)
−D(p(wI , wE);γ)(p(wI , wE)− wI) = 0. (3)
E optimally sets its wholesale price such that the downstream firms are indifferent
between breaching or not. The first term denotes the profit that a downstream firm
obtains when breaching provided the other downstream firm also breaches, the second
term denotes the damage payment to I in case of contract breach, which is half the
profit that I makes when none of the firms breaches, and the third term denotes the
profit that a downstream firm makes when not breaching provided the other down-
stream firm breaches.
If γ = 0, it is easy to see that there exists an equilibrium in which both downstream
firms breach when E sets wE = cI since D(p(cI))(p(cI)−cI) > D(p(wI))(p(wI)−cI). If,
however, γ becomes sufficiently large, E needs to set wE < cI for such an equilibrium
to exist. To see this note that the first term of (3) goes to zero when downstream
competition becomes very intense as p(wE, wE)→ wE, while the two last terms of (3)
are negative. Thus, when γ is sufficiently large and E sets wE = cI the condition for
both downstream firms to breach would be violated. E then needs to set wE < cI ,
which increases the first term, does not change the second, and raises the third term,
so that (3) is satisfied. It follows that there must exist a value of γ, which we denote
γˇ, such that E needs to set wE = cI if γ = γˇ and wE < cI if γ > γˇ for an equilibrium
in which both downstream firms breach to exist.
We now turn to the case in which E wants to induce just one downstream firm to
breach. To do so, E must set we = w
′
E, where w
′
E is defined by
D(p(w′E, wI);γ)(p(w
′
E, wI)− w′E)− 2D(p(wI , wI);γ)(wI − cI)
+D(p(wI , w
′
E);γ)(wI − cI)−D(p(wI , wI);γ)(p(wI , wI)− wI) = 0. (4)
The first term denotes the profit that a downstream makes when breaching provided
the other downstream firm does not breach, the second and the third term denote the
damage payment to I in case of contract breach, which is the profit that I makes if the
downstream firm does not breach minus the profit that I makes when it breaches, and
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the fourth term denotes the profit that a downstream firm makes when not breaching
provided the other firm does not breach.
Two cases can now occur, namely, either w′E ≥ wE or w′E < wE. If w′E ≥ wE, then in
any subgame perfect equilibrium one downstream firm breaches if E sets we ∈ (wE, w′E]
and both downstream firms breach if E sets we ≤ wE. If, however, w′E < wE, there are
two subgame perfect equilibria if E sets we ∈ (w′E, wE], with either both downstream
firms or no downstream firm breaching. By assumption the downstream firms are able
to coordinate themselves to play the equilibrium that is Pareto dominant from their
perspective. Here, the Pareto dominant equilibrium is the equilibrium in which no
downstream firm breaches as each firm exerts a negative externality on the other firm
when breaching. It follows that E can only induce both downstream firms to breach
when setting we = w
′
E.
We will now show that there always exists a region in which E must set we < cI to
induce both downstream firms to breach. We do so by showing that at γ = γˇ, at which
wE = cI , w
′
E lies below cI . If w
′
E lies below cI at γ = γˇ, E must set we < cI to induce
both downstream firms to breach. By our assumption on f , E would nevertheless find
it profitable to enter.
We know that at γˇ equation (3) can be written as
D(p(cI , cI);γˇ)(p(cI , cI)− cI)−D(p(wI , wI);γˇ)(wI − cI)
−D(p(wI , cI);γˇ)(p(wI , cI)− wI) = 0. (5)
We need to show that w′E is lower than cI when (5) is fulfilled, which is equivalent to
the left-hand side of (4) being negative when w′E = cI , i.e.,
D(p(cI , wI);γˇ)(p(cI , wI)− cI)− 2D(p(wI , wI);γˇ)(wI − cI)
+D(p(wI , cI);γˇ)(wI − cI)−D(p(wI , wI);γˇ)(p(wI , wI)− wI) < 0. (6)
Subtracting the left-hand side of (6) from the left-hand side of (5) and rearranging the
terms, we obtain
D(p(cI , cI);γˇ)(p(cI , cI)− cI) +D(p(wI , wI);γˇ)(p(wI , wI)− cI)
−D(p(cI , wI);γˇ)(p(cI , wI)− cI)−D(p(wI , cI);γˇ)(p(wI , cI)− cI),
which needs to be positive for our result to hold. We can rewrite the last expression as
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D(p(cI , cI);γˇ)(p(cI , cI)− cI)−D(p(wI , cI);γˇ)(p(wI , cI)− cI)
+D(p(wI , wI);γˇ)(wI − cI) +D(p(wI , wI);γˇ)(wI − cI)
−D(p(cI , wI);γˇ)(wI − cI)−D(p(wI , wI);γˇ)(wI − cI)
+D(p(wI , wI);γˇ)(p(wI , wI)− wI)−D(p(cI , wI);γˇ)((p(cI , wI)− wI). (7)
We start with the first line of (7). We know that (3) is just satisfied at γˇ, i.e.,
D(p(cI , cI);γˇ)(p(cI , cI)−cI) = D(p(wI , wI);γˇ)(wI−cI)+D(p(wI , cI);γˇ)(p(wI , cI)−wI).
(8)
Inserting the right-hand side of (8) into the first line of (7) gives
D(p(wI , wI);γˇ)(wI − cI) +D(p(wI , cI);γˇ)(p(wI , cI)− wI)
−D(p(wI , cI);γˇ)(wI − cI)−D(p(wI , cI); γˇ)(p(wI , cI)− wI)
= [D(p(wI , wI);γˇ)−D(p(wI , cI);γˇ)](wI − cI) > 0.
The first line of (7) is therefore positive since a downstream firm’s demand increases
in the rival firm’s price, i.e. D(p(wI , wI);γˇ) > D(p(wI , cI);γˇ).
Now we turn to the second and third line. In case both downstream firms have
signed the contract, we know that I maximizes
max
wi,wj
D(p(wi, wj);γˇ)(wi − cI) +D(p(wj, wi);γˇ)(wj − cI)
and that wI is the solution to this maximization problem. Therefore, line 2 of (7)
equals I’s monopoly profit when it charges wi = wj = wI , while line 3 of (7) displays
I’s profit when making a suboptimal pricing decision, namely wi = cI and wj = wI . It
follows that line 2 and 3 of (7) are positive by the definition of wI .
Closer inspection of line 4 reveals that it is positive if a downstream firm makes
higher profits when setting its price on the basis of its true input cost—call it c′—
instead of a lower input cost—call it c < c′. When basing its pricing decision on
different costs, a downstream firm does not only change its own price but also its
rival’s price. Generally optimality of the cost-based decision requires
max
c
D(p(c, y);γˇ)(p(c, y)− c′),
which gives a first-order condition of
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D(p(c, y);γˇ)
∂p(c, y)
∂c
+
∂D(p(c, y);γˇ)
∂p(c, y)
∂p(c, y)
∂c
(p(c, y)− c′)
+
∂D(p(c, y);γˇ)
∂p(y, c)
∂p(y, c)
∂c
(p(c, y)− c′) = 0. (9)
Further, the optimality condition for the downstream price p(c, y), resulting from the
maximization problem
argmax
p(c,y)
D(p(c, y);γˇ)(p(c, y)− c),
is given by
∂D(p(c, y);γˇ)
∂p(c, y)
(p(c, y)− c) +D(p(c, y);γˇ) = 0
and can be rewritten as
D(p(c, y);γˇ) +
∂D(p(c, y);γˇ)
∂p(c, y)
p(c, y) =
∂D(p(c, y);γˇ)
∂p(c, y)
c. (10)
Inserting (10) into (9) gives
∂D(p(c, y);γˇ)
∂p(c, y)
∂p(c, y)
∂c
(c− c′) + ∂D(p(c, y);γˇ)
∂p(y, c)
∂p(y, c)
∂c
(p(c, y)− c′) = 0.
The second term is positive while the first term depends on the sign of c − c′. Since
∂D(p(c, y);γˇ)/∂p(c, y) is negative and ∂p(c, y)/∂c is positive, optimality requires that
c > c′. Hence, it can never be better for a downstream firm to set a price on the basis
of a lower input cost than its true input cost, which implies that line 4 of (7) must be
positive.
We can conclude that the expression in (7) is positive, implying w′E < cI at γˇ. By
continuity there exists a region around γˇ, such that we < cI . Let us denote the lower
bound of this region γ˜ and the upper bound γ, with γ˜ < γˇ < γ.
Finally, we need to show that γˇ lies indeed above γ̂. First note that at γ = γ̂
condition (2) can be written as
D(p(cI , cI);γ̂)(p(cI , cI)−cI) = D(p(wI , wI);γ̂)(p(wI , wI)−wI)+D(p(wI , wI);γ̂)(wI−cI).
(11)
However, γˇ is defined by
D(p(cI , cI);γˇ)(p(cI , cI)−cI) = D(p(wI , cI);γˇ)(p(wI , cI)−wI)+D(p(wI , wI);γˇ)(wI−cI).
(12)
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The difference between (11) and (12) is the first term on the two right-hand sides.
We know that D(p(wI , cI);γ)(p(wI , cI) − wI) < D(p(wI , wI);γ)(p(wI , wI) − wI). In
addition, we know that for γ = 0, the left-hand sides of (11) and (12) are bigger than
the respective right-hand sides while for γ → 1, the reverse holds true. Since γ̂ is
defined as the largest γ for which (11) holds, it follows that for γˇ to fulfill (12) we must
have γˇ > γ̂. At last, we define γ ≡ max[γ̂, γ˜]. 
C Proof of Lemma 1′
From the analysis above we know that I makes use of exclusive contracting if the
monopoly profit that it earns when both downstream firms sign is higher than twice
the compensation (x2 = pi
c
i|S=2 − pifi|S=1) that it has to offer to each downstream firm
for signing. I’s monopoly wholesale price is wI = (1 + cI)/2. Thus, when both down-
stream firms sign the contract, I obtains a monopoly profit equal to ΠI(wI , wI) =
(1− cI)2/(2(1 + γ)(2− γ)) and each downstream firm makes profits equal to pici|S=2 =
(1 − cI)2(1 − γ)/(4(1 + γ)(2 − γ)2). We know from the previous analysis that a sin-
gle captive downstream firm is induced to breach when E sets we = cI . Therefore,
a downstream firm’s profit when rejecting the exclusive contract, given the rival firm
accepts it, is pifi|S=1 = (1− cI)2(1− γ)/((2− γ)2(1 + γ)). We can deduce that I makes
effective use of exclusive contracting if
ΠI(wI , wI)− 2
[
pici|S=2 − pifi|S=1
]
=
(1− cI)2
2(1 + γ)(2− γ) −
3(1− cI)2(1− γ)
2(2− γ)2(1 + γ) ≥ 0.
It is easy to verify that the inequality holds for γ ∈ [0.5, 1). 
D Proof of Lemma 2′
From the previous lemma we know that I does not offer exclusive contracts to the
downstream firms if γ ∈ [0, 0.5). All downstream firms are free in that case. The
subsequent price game between the upstream firms results in the simple Bertrand
duopoly prices. Both downstream firms buy from E at we = cI > cE.
If γ ∈ [0.5, 1), we know that I offers exclusive contracts that both downstream firms
sign. I charges the monopoly wholesale price, wc = wI , to captive downstream firms
and the Bertrand duopoly price wf = cI to free downstream firms, i.e., those firms that
breach the contract later on. It follows that E is constraint in its pricing decision to
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free downstream firms by we ≤ cI . An equilibrium exists, in which both downstream
firms breach, when E sets a wholesale price wE such that condition (3) is met. Each
downstream firm needs to be indifferent between breaching or not, given the rival firm
breaches. If firm i adheres to the contract while firm j breaches, firm i only receives
positive demand if pi and pj are sufficiently close, i.e., if (−1 + γ + pi)/γ < pj. If pi
and pj are sufficiently close, condition (3) is satisfied for
wE1 =
1
4(2− γ2)(2− 2γ − γ2)
[
4γ4 + 2(3 + cE)γ
3 + θ(1− cE)(γ3 − 2γ)− 4(3 + cE)γ
− (1− cE)(2− θ)(2 + γ)
√
(1− γ)(2− γ2)(6− 8γ − γ2 + 2γ3) + 16(1− γ2)
]
,
where we replaced cI by θw
m(cE) + (1− θ)cE.
If downstream competition is relatively strong, firm i receives no demand when
adhering to the contract, given firm j breaches. In this case, we are in the region
0 < pj ≤ (−1 + γ + pi)/γ and condition (3) is satisfied for
wE2 = 1−
(1− cE)(2− θ)
√
(2− γ)(1− γ)
4(1− γ) .
We now determine for which regions of γ the wholesale prices wE1 and wE2 are relevant.
Determining pi and pj for the case in which firm j breaches and buys at wE1 while
firm i adheres to the contract and buys at wc = wI , and inserting these prices into
(−1 + γ + pi)/γ < pj, gives that wE1 is relevant for γ ∈ [0.5, 0.710). Similarly, by
determining pi and pj for the case in which firm j buys at wE2 and firm i buys at
wc = wI , and inserting these prices into pj ≤ (−1+γ+pi)/γ, gives that wE2 is relevant
for γ ∈ [0.710, 1).15
For an equilibrium to exist, in which exactly one downstream firm breaches the
exclusive contract, E must set a wholesale price w′E such that condition (4) is met. A
downstream firm needs to be indifferent between breaching or not provided the rival
firm does not breach. If the captive firm j still receives positive demand when firm i
breaches the contract, condition (4) is fulfilled for
w′E1 =
1
4(2− γ2)2
[
16− 8γ − 16γ2 + 3γ3 + 4γ4 + (4γ − 3
2
γ3)(cE(2− θ) + θ)
− 1
2
(2− θ)(1− cE)(2 + γ)
√
48− 96γ + 12γ2 + 76γ3 − 31γ4 − 16γ5 + 8γ6
]
.
15The reason why the threshold values for the two regions coincide at γ = 0.710 is that firm i’s
profit function has a kink but no jump at (−1 + γ + pi)/γ = pj . Thus, the wholesale prices wE1 and
wE2 are identical at the value where one switches from one region to the other.
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If the captive firm j receives no demand when firm i breaches the contract, condition
(4) is satisfied for
w′E2 =
2 (1− γ)2 (2− γ2) + cE (2 + (1− γ) γ2) (2− θ) + (2 + γ2 − γ3) θ
2 (2− γ)2 γ (1 + γ) .
In the same way as above we can determine for which region of γ the two wholesale
prices are relevant. Here, we obtain that w′E1 is relevant for γ ∈ [0.5, 0.706) and w′E2 is
relevant for γ ∈ [0.706, 1].
It is straightforward to verify that w′E1 lies below wE1 for γ ∈ [0.5, 0.706). Thus,
when E charges w′E1 , in the unique equilibrium both downstream firms breach the
exclusive contract. When E charges we ∈ (w′E1 , wE1 ], there are two equilibria with
either both downstream firms or no downstream firm breaching the exclusive contract.
By assumption the downstream firms play the Pareto dominant equilibrium which is
the one in which no downstream firm breaches. It follows that it is optimal for E to
charge we = min[w
′
E1
, cI ], inducing both downstream firms to breach. We find that
w′E1 lies above cI for γ ∈ [0.5, 0.618). Since cI > cE, E sets we = cI and induces both
downstream firms to breach if γ ∈ [0.5, 0.618). To analyze whether it is profitable
for E to set w′E1 if γ ∈ [0.618, 0.706) we need to compare w′E1 with cE. Since w′E1 is
strictly decreasing in γ, a sufficient condition for w′E1 to be larger than cE provided
γ ∈ [0.618, 0.706) is that w′E1 > cE at γ = 0.706. We find that w′E1 > cE at γ = 0.706 if
θ ≥ 0.121, which is fulfilled by assumption. Therefore, in equilibrium E sets we = w′E1
and induces both downstream firms to breach if γ ∈ [0.618, 0.706).
We now turn to the case in which γ ∈ [0.706, 0.710). Here the relevant wholesale
prices are w′E2 and wE1 . By comparing these wholesale prices we find that w
′
E2
< wE1 ,
which again implies that for we ∈ (w′E2 , wE1 ] multiple equilibria exist in which either
both or no downstream firm breaches the contract. By the same argument as above,
the downstream firms coordinate themselves on the equilibrium in which none of them
breaches since this is Pareto dominant. It is easy to verify that w′E2 is smaller than cI
and that it exceeds cE for γ ∈ [0.706, 0.710) if θ ≥ 0.121. Therefore, it is optimal for
E to set we = w
′
E2
, inducing both downstream firms to breach if γ ∈ [0.706, 0.710).
Finally, we turn to the case in which γ ∈ [0.710, 1). E can choose between wE2
and w′E2 . For γ ∈ [0.710, 0.714) we find that w′E2 < wE2 . In the same way as above,
we obtain that it is optimal for E to set we = w
′
E2
and induce both downstream firms
to breach if θ ≥ 0.118, which is fulfilled by assumption. To determine whether it is
more profitable for E to set wE2 or w
′
E2
when γ ∈ [0.714, 1), we compare the profits
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that E makes in each case. The profit that E makes when setting wE2 , inducing both
downstream firms to breach, is
ΠE(wE2 , wE2) =
(1− cE)2(2− θ)
√
(2− γ)(1− γ)
[
4(1− γ)− (2− θ)√(2− γ)(1− γ)]
8(2− γ)(1− γ)2(1 + γ) ,
and the profit that E makes when setting w′E2 , inducing one downstream firm to breach,
is
ΠE(w
′
E2
, wI) =
(1− cE)2(2− θ)(2(2− γ2)(1− γ)2 − θ(2 + γ2 − γ3))
8(2− γ)2γ2(1 + γ) .
By solving ΠE(wE2 , wE2) = ΠE(w
′
E2
, wI) for θ we obtain
θˆ(γ) =
2(2− (2− γ)γ(3 + γ(1− 2√(2− γ)(1− γ)− (2− γ)γ)))
2− (2− γ)γ(1 + 2γ) . (13)
For all θ > θˆ(γ) we have that ΠE(wE2 , wE2) > ΠE(w
′
E2
, wI) and vice versa. It is
straightforward to verify that θˆ(γ) is strictly increasing in γ. Inserting γ = 0.714 into
θˆ(γ) yields θˆ(0.714) = 0.114, while θˆ(γ) equals 1 when γ = 0.899.
We now have to show that it is profitable for E to enter and set either wE2 or w
′
E2
if γ ∈ [0.714, 1). As w′E2 is relevant when E’s efficiency advantage is low we only need
to compare w′E2 with cE. Since w
′
E2
is strictly increasing in γ, a sufficient condition
for w′E2 to be larger than cE provided γ ∈ [0.714, 1) is that w′E2 > cE at γ = 0.714.
We find that w′E2 > cE at γ = 0.714 for θ ≥ 0.114, which is again fulfilled by our
assumption that θ ≥ 0.121. Therefore, when γ ∈ [0.714, 0.899) and θ < θˆ(γ), it is
optimal for E to set we = w
′
E2
, inducing one downstream firm to breach. Whereas,
when γ ∈ [0.714, 0.899) and θ ≥ θˆ(γ), it is optimal for E to set we = wE2 , inducing
both downstream firms to breach. When γ ∈ [0.899, 1), it is always optimal for E to
set we = w
′
E2
, inducing one downstream firm to breach. 
E Proof of Proposition 1′
When exclusive dealing is not possible, E enters and the subsequent price game between
the upstream firms results in the simple Bertrand duopoly prices, i.e., both upstream
firms set wholesale prices equal to cI . When exclusive contracting is possible and
γ ∈ [0, 0.5), both downstream firms decline I’s offer for an exclusive contract. When
γ ∈ [0.5, 0.618), both downstream firms sign the exclusive contract, but are induced
to breach if E sets we = cI . In both these cases the outcome is unaffected by the
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possibility of exclusive contracting.
When (i) γ ∈ [0.618, 0.714) or (ii) γ ∈ [0.714, 0.899) ∧ θ ≥ θˆ(γ), both downstream
firms sign the exclusive contract and are induced to breach at a price we < cI . Because
the downstream firms acquire the input good at a lower price, they set lower prices to
final consumers. As a consequence, consumer surplus and welfare rise.
Finally, when (i) γ ∈ [0.714, 0.899) ∧ θ < θˆ(γ) or (ii) γ ∈ [0.899, 1), both down-
stream firms sign the exclusive contract and E induces one downstream firm to breach
at a wholesale price we < cI . The breaching downstream firm sets a price to final
consumers, ped = (cI + 2γ − 1)/2γ, that leads to monopolization of the downstream
market. Because ped is higher than the price that the downstream firms would set
absent exclusive dealing, pned = (cI−γ+1)/(2−γ), consumer surplus and welfare fall.

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